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Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2011
Latin America recorded aggregate growth of 6.3% in 2010,1 the highest rate in the decade, 
exceeding by nearly two percentage points (pp) the average for the expansionary fi ve-year 
period preceding the crisis. As in that expansionary phase, growth in the region was based on 
the vigour of domestic demand, which was again driven by the same, at least partially corre-
lated, external factors. The fi rst of these is the upward cycle in commodity prices, which ben-
efi ts South American economies specialised in the export of these products by improving their 
terms of trade. This specialisation explains a large part of the divergence between the slower 
recovery of Mexico, integrated commercially and fi nancially with the United States, and the 
dynamism shown by Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Chile (see Chart 1), which trade more with Asia 
and are more specialised (to varying degrees) in commodity trade. The second dynamism-en-
hancing factor is the large infl ow of international fi nancing into the region, refl ected in favourable 
conditions of market access for both the public and the private sector, which has helped to 
drive the recovery of credit. In this respect, it should be noted that fi nancing conditions have 
scarcely been affected in the last six months, except for a certain increase in risk premia and 
for the partial (and temporary) reversal of some capital fl ows due to the tensions associated 
with the European crisis, the socio-political instability in the north of Africa and the Middle East 
and the earthquake in Japan. This demonstrates Latin America’s deep-seated resilience.
To the momentum provided by these external factors should be added the effect of a combination 
of economic policies which, although they have begun to turn towards the withdrawal of the 
stimuli provided during the crisis, have not been overly restrictive in any country. This has given 
rise to a highly expansionary macroeconomic performance in 2010 and the early months of 2011.
Thus, against the background of strongly growing economies and of a fresh upward trend in 
commodity prices from the end of 2010, infl ation has begun to predominate amongst the 
economic policy concerns of the Latin American authorities in several of the countries with 
infl ation targets. The average infl ation rate of the region rose to more than 6.5% at the begin-
ning of 2011, practically 1 pp above that at the end-2009 and in some countries approaching 
the ceiling of the target bands (see Chart 1). Additionally, some of this rise has fed through to 
expectations. Thus, although the rise in prices has been driven mainly by higher food prices, 
signs of demand pressure have been perceived in various economies, now that the output 
gaps which opened during the crisis have been closed.
Monetary policy has continued to confront the dilemma of how to contain infl ationary pressures 
before they end up disanchoring expectations and at the same time prevent the monetary tighten-
ing from further spurring capital infl ows and exchange rate appreciation. In this situation, the rever-
sal of the more volatile capital fl ows between January and March 2011, associated with the port-
folio restructuring which prompted the improved outlook for the American economy, mitigated the 
dilemma at least temporarily and gave the authorities more room to tighten monetary policies. Four 
of the fi ve central banks in the region which have infl ation targets raised their offi cial rates at that 
time, following the pause or slowdown in the cyclical rises in the closing months of 2010.
Against this background, the recent economic developments pose some uncertainties. Par-
ticularly noteworthy is the notable divergence between the stagnation of industrial production 
Introduction
1. This is the weighted average growth rate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, the coun-
tries on whose data this report is based.
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in various countries since 2010 Q2 and the strength of the consumption indicators. In a setting 
of strong commodity price rises like the present one, and of across-the-board exchange rate 
appreciation (the Brazilian real and the Chilean peso are among the currencies which have 
appreciated most since 2009, these being, in general, the currencies of commodity exporting 
countries), it may be asked whether the current trend towards more moderate growth refl ects 
a shift towards more sustainable rates or whether, by contrast, it may be a symptom of loss of 
competitiveness or “Dutch disease”.
Despite these overarching doubts, the short-term prospects for Latin America remain favour-
able. In 2011 growth may moderate towards rates more compatible with potential growth, 
refl ecting the closure of the output gap and the progressive tightening of policies. The main 
short-term risks include higher oil prices, the still fragile European situation and the possibility 
of overheating of some economies in the region. This latter risk will be more serious if eco-
nomic policies do not respond quickly enough, giving rise to a disanchoring of infl ation expec-
tations or to greater fragility of the external accounts. The recent oil price rise will have an un-
even impact on the region, with Chile being the potentially most prejudiced country in terms of 
growth and infl ation due to its greater energy dependence; by contrast, Venezuela is the most 
favoured country because its exports consist almost entirely of oil. In terms of trade exposure, 
Latin America’s exports to North Africa and the Middle East represent a small fraction of its 
total exports, as do its exports to Japan (around 5% of total exports). Exports to the euro area 
are signifi cant (more than 12% in aggregate, although they vary widely across exporting coun-
tries), but not those to the countries most affected by the crisis (around 3% of total exports). 
For this reason, a signifi cant direct impact through the trade channel is not to be expected, nor 
has there been one through the fi nancial channel.
Meanwhile, the fi rming of the global economic recovery, particularly in the United States, may 
moderate capital infl ows into Latin America, thereby helping make monetary policy manage-
ment easier, as noted above. However, this may involve a certain risk of reversal of capital fl ows, 
although, given the region’s fundamentals, this does not seem likely. In the medium term, the 
main risks derive, fi rst, from the possibility of a disorderly adjustment in interest rates in the 
United States (due to the eventual withdrawal of monetary stimuli or to the deterioration of the 
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fi scal situation in that country), which, if sharp, could prompt a signifi cant reversal of capital 
fl ows; and, second, from a strong deceleration of growth in Asia, given the region’s depend-
ence on it. These risks underline the need to take advantage of the current expansionary phase 
of the cycle in Latin America to rebuild the policy margins eroded during the crisis and strength-
en the capacity to absorb capital infl ows, insofar as they are permanent.
Following a moderate slowdown in mid-2010, global economic activity rose somewhat in 2010 
Q4. The introduction of new expansionary monetary and fi scal measures in United States contrib-
uted to put the global recovery on a fi rmer footing, despite the re-emergence of sovereign tensions 
in the euro area, this time linked to the fragility of the Irish banking system. Thus, against a back-
ground of prolonged dynamism of the emerging countries, the US economy picked up slightly in 
the last quarter of the year. However, some European economies, both in the euro area and, above 
all, the United Kingdom, continued to show signs of weakness. The latest indicators for the devel-
oped economies point to a continuation of the recovery despite the persistence of the sovereign 
crisis in the euro area, the geopolitical tensions in the Arab countries (which are exacerbating the 
upward trend in oil prices) and the Japanese earthquake with its grave consequences. In the 
United States, the job creation and industrial production fi gures seem to evidence a fi rmer pattern, 
although the delicate fi scal situation continues to be a signifi cant source of uncertainty.
The emerging economies continued to show considerable dynamism, especially in emerging 
Asia, which recorded year-on-year growth of 8.5% in the fourth quarter. Hence these econo-
mies continued to account for a substantial part of global growth (see Chart 2). Some of them 
showed signs of overheating, against a background in which commodity prices continued the 
upward trend initiated in mid-2010. The rises were particularly sharp in crude oil as a result of 
the instability of some of the main producers, which added to the pressure exerted by the ro-
bust demand, and the price of Brent oil topped $120 per barrel at the beginning of April, 
compared with $80 per barrel at the end of September.
Against this backdrop, the international fi nancial markets showed uneven behaviour across 
regions in 2010 Q4, within a global trend towards normalisation. The United States saw stock 
market gains and falling risk premia on debt securities, in a setting of improved economic 
prospects. By contrast, the euro area suffered a fresh outbreak of tensions in the sovereign 
debt markets owing to the Irish crisis, which was refl ected in broader spreads on government 
securities in the countries farthest from the euro area core countries. In the early months of 
2011, the international fi nancial markets were increasingly affected by the tensions in the Arab 
countries and, to a greater extent, by the earthquake in Japan and its grave consequences. 
However, despite these events, which caused volatility to surge, there was a moderately pos-
itive trend in the markets, underpinned by the good growth prospects.
In the area of monetary policy, offi cial interest rates held near to zero in the advanced economies. 
In addition, following the signs of weakness in activity in mid-2010, the authorities of Japan and, 
in particular, of the United States stepped up the quantitative stimuli in the last part of 2010. Sub-
sequently, against a background of fi rmer recovery and expectations of rising infl ation, the mar-
kets began to discount earlier rises in offi cial rates, particularly in the United Kingdom and the euro 
area. In fact, the ECB raised its policy interest rate by 25 basis points (bp) to 1.25% on 7 April. In 
the case of the Bank of England, the markets expect the upturn to start in spring. In this respect, 
the increasingly imminent withdrawal of the extraordinary stimuli in the advanced economies 
represents a certain risk to the recovery, which in some of these countries is still fragile. Further, 
the improved growth outlook in late 2010 prompted rises in the yields on long-term debt in the 
United States, which increased by around 100 bp in Q4 to nearly 3.5%, fl uctuating around this 
level in 2011 to date (see Chart 2). In the foreign exchange markets, the sharp depreciation of the 
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dollar from March 2010 reversed in the closing stages of the year. Also noteworthy was the up-
ward pressure on the yen following the earthquake, which triggered a coordinated intervention by 
the G7 to halt this movement, which was successful. Emerging markets performed favourably in 
the period, in line with the perception of strength of these economies (see Chart 2).
In the last six months the Latin American fi nancial markets have gone through two clearly differ-
entiated phases. In the fi rst, which lasted until end-2010, the indirect effects of the monetary re-
laxation in the United States and the favourable growth prospects in the emerging economies 
continued to dominate. This gave rise to fairly widespread rises in stock markets and to the sta-
bilisation of sovereign spreads near their historical lows, this tendency only being interrupted by 
sporadic temporary rises in volatility due to external events (such as the Irish crisis in November). 
Exchange rates tended to stabilise after appreciating in the preceding months, and in some coun-
tries this stabilisation was associated with the imposition of capital controls or an increase in in-
terventions to purchase reserves. Notably in 2010 the volume of capital infl ows reached that re-
corded before the crisis and, in certain specifi c segments, amply exceeded it (portfolio investment, 
$95 billion in year-on-year terms; see Chart 3). Foreign direct investment, which had tended to lag 
behind portfolio fl ows in the initial quarters of the recovery, recovered strongly in 2010 H2, reach-
ing $100 billion in year-on-year terms. Also, a considerable number of sovereign and corporate 
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issues were launched on the international markets, mainly by primary sector fi rms, particularly in 
Brazil and Venezuela, followed by banks, especially in Brazil and Colombia. The gross capital 
fl ows into the region reached a historical high (more than $250 billion), and the region’s relative 
share of the total fl ows to emerging economies increased signifi cantly, a trend which will foresee-
ably continue in the following years according to the latest IMF projections.2
This fi rst phase was followed, between January and March, by a period of higher volatility in the 
Latin American fi nancial markets, in a setting of apparent rebalancing of international portfolios 
towards the developed markets, particularly the United States, given the confi rmation of improved 
growth prospects. The higher volatility derived from events in the Middle East and the Japanese 
earthquake affected the Latin American markets moderately, principally the higher risk ones (Ar-
gentina and Venezuela) and those with a higher exposure to Japanese investors (Brazil and Mexi-
co, whose currencies depreciated sharply in the week following the earthquake). Against this 
background, the stock market indices fell and the sovereign spread widened. In the local-currency 
debt markets, yields rose also because of the upward trend in infl ation and the sharper pace of 
2. The gross capital fl ows to Latin America in 2010 accounted for 27% of the fl ows to emerging economies, behind Asia 
(45%) and ahead of eastern Europe (9%). This percentage is 10 pp higher than Latin America’s average level for the decade.
CHART 3  
SOURCES: JP Morgan, IMF and national statistics. 
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offi cial interest rate rises in some countries. However, in April these trends began to reverse again 
and exchange rates came under renewed upward pressure, refl ecting new capital infl ows.
In the total period analysed, i.e. from October 2010 to April 2011, the sovereign spread, as meas-
ured by the regional EMBI, moved in a relatively narrow range, between 350 bp and 290 bp, show-
ing decreases in most countries. These were particularly notable in Argentina (154 bp), Venezuela 
(156 bp) and Ecuador (276 bp), owing in this case to the improvement in the sovereign rating in 
February. CDSs performed in a similar fashion (see Chart 4). The opposite happened in the Peruvian 
fi nancial markets, where volatility rose and risk premia widened at the beginning of April against a 
backdrop dominated by the presidential elections. As for the stock markets, the local-currency 
Latin American MSCI regional index remained practically steady in the review period, compared with 
moderate rises in emerging Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and sharper ones in emerging Europe. 
By country, between October and April there were moderate falls in the indices of Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia and sharp rises in Peru (13.4%), Mexico (11.2%) and Argentina (30%) (see Chart 4).
The capital infl ows in the period continued putting upward pressure on exchange rates. The six-
month review period saw appreciations against the dollar of nearly 6% in Brazil and Mexico, 
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mainly towards the end of the period. Also signifi cant was the appreciation of the Colombian peso 
since the end of the year (by 12%). Thus the exchange rates of these currencies against the dollar 
standard levels similar to those of summer 2008, and signifi cantly above the lows recorded during 
the crisis (in particular, 17% in Peru, 32% in Mexico, 43% in Colombia, 45% in Chile and 59% in 
Brazil). In real effective terms, exchange rates also continued appreciating, reaching, in the case of 
Brazil, a historical high (see Chart 4). The large capital infl ows in late 2010 prompted interventions 
in the foreign exchange markets –both pre-announced (Mexico, Colombia and Chile from January) 
and discretionary– and the introduction of diverse capital control measures, which in most cases 
failed to prevent stronger appreciation than in other emerging economies (see Chart 4).
The annual growth of 6.3% of the Latin American economy in 2010 is the result of rates above 
7.5% in Argentina, Peru and Brazil and above 4% in Mexico, Chile and Colombia, which evi-
dence the pervasive strength of the recovery in the region, although at varying paces (see Ta-
ble 1 and the section on economic performance by country). However, just as activity was 
surprisingly high in 2010 H1, it was somewhat less than expected in H2. In particular, the 
year-on-year GDP growth rates of the region moderated to 6% and 5.3% in Q3 and Q4, re-
spectively, around 1.5 pp below those in the fi rst half of the year, while the quarterly rates were 
below 1%, compared with an average of 1.7% in H1 (see Chart 5).
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 March
GDP (year-on-year rate):
Latin America (a) 4.3 -2.0 6.3 -2.9 -4.2 -2.6 1.7 5.9 7.9 6.0 5.3
Argentina (b) 6.8 0.9 9.2 2.0 -0.8 -0.3 2.6 6.8 11.8 8.6 9.2
Brazil 5.2 -0.6 7.5 -3.0 -2.8 -1.8 5.0 9.3 9.2 6.7 5.0
Mexico 1.5 -6.1 5.5 -7.2 -9.6 -5.5 -2.0 4.5 7.7 5.3 4.6
Chile 3.7 -1.7 5.2 -2.1 -4.5 -1.4 2.1 1.7 6.4 6.9 5.8
Colombia (c) 3.5 1.5 4.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.8 2.9 4.2 4.9 3.6 4.6
Venezuela 4.8 -3.3 -1.4 0.5 -2.6 -4.6 -5.8 -4.8 -1.6 0.0 0.6
Peru 9.8 0.9 8.8 1.9 -1.2 -0.6 3.4 6.2 10.0 9.6 9.2
Uruguay 8.6 2.6 8.5 2.6 1.1 2.8 4.7 9.6 10.5 7.7 6.5
CPI (year-on-year rate):
Latin America (a) 7.8 6.4 6.4 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.4 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.7 6.7
Argentina (b) 8.6 6.3 10.5 6.6 5.5 5.9 7.1 9.0 10.6 11.1 11.0 9.7
Brazil 5.7 4.9 5.0 5.8 5.2 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 5.6 6.3
Mexico 5.1 5.3 4.2 6.2 6.0 5.1 4.0 4.8 4.0 3.7 4.2 3.0
Chile 8.7 0.4 1.4 4.8 1.8 -1.9 -3.0 -0.3 1.2 2.2 2.5 3.4
Colombia 7.0 4.2 2.3 6.6 4.8 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.2
Venezuela 31.4 28.6 29.0 29.5 28.2 28.7 28.1 27.4 31.9 29.8 27.3 28.7
Peru 5.8 2.9 1.5 5.6 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.7
Uruguay 7.9 7.1 6.7 8.2 6.7 7.1 6.3 6.7 6.9 6.3 6.9 8.2
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP):
Latin America (a) (d) -0.5 -2.9 -2.2 -1.5 -2.0 -3.1 -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.2
Argentina 1.4 -0.6 0.2 1.1 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.2
Brazil -2.0 -3.3 -2.6 -2.8 -3.1 -4.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -2.3 -2.6
Mexico -0.1 -2.3 -2.8 -1.4 -1.7 -2.3 -2.1 -1.8 -2.1 -2.4 -2.7
Chile 5.0 -4.6 -0.3 1.3 -1.5 -3.9 -4.6 -3.9 -1.1 0.0 -0.3
Colombia -1.8 -3.8 -3.6 -2.7 -3.0 -3.2 -3.8 -3.4 -4.0 -3.6 -3.6
Venezuela -1.2 -5.1 - -2.3 -2.8 -3.9 -5.1 -4.8 -3.8 -3.5 -
Peru 2.2 -1.8 0.0 1.4 0.1 -0.7 -1.8 -1.3 -1.0 -0.3 0.0
Uruguay -1.5 -1.7 -1.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2 -1.7 -1.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP):
Latin America (a) 30.7 34.7 33.7 31.4 33.1 34.5 34.2 34.1 33.1 33.4 32.9
Argentina 44.7 47.9 44.6 48.8 43.9 46.4 45.8 47.9 40.5 43.3 41.3
Brazil 38.5 42.8 40.4 39.3 41.5 43.3 42.8 41.9 40.9 40.3 40.4
Mexico 24.3 28.0 27.4 27.0 27.2 27.5 26.3 27.7 27.5 27.3 25.9
Chile 5.2 6.2 9.2 5.0 4.9 5.8 6.1 6.9 7.5 8.7 9.2
Colombia 33.2 34.7 34.8 36.8 35.2 33.6 35.1 34.3 35.1 34.7 34.8
Venezuela 13.6 22.6 28.4 13.5 18.1 20.4 22.6 19.0 22.4 26.1 28.4
Peru 24.2 27.3 23.9 24.8 26.1 27.2 27.3 25.5 24.2 23.7 23.9
Uruguay 52.9 69.8 57.4 56.7 60.5 67.3 69.1 65.7 59.0 58.4 57.3
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP):
Latin America (a) (d) -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7
Argentina 2.0 3.6 1.0 2.3 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 1.4 0.9
Brazil -1.7 -1.5 -2.3 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3
Mexico -1.5 -0.7 -0.5 -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5
Chile -1.9 1.6 1.9 -2.0 -1.4 0.7 2.6 2.4 1.8 1.6 1.9
Colombia -2.8 -2.2 -3.1 -3.3 -3.0 -2.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.8 -3.1
Venezuela 12.0 2.6 6.1 7.6 2.9 -0.6 2.6 6.0 6.8 6.3 6.1
Peru -4.2 0.2 -1.5 -3.3 -2.4 -1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -1.5
Uruguay -4.7 0.7 -0.4 -3.8 -1.1 -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 -0.4
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP):
Latin America (a) 17.5 20.6 20.7 18.7 19.6 20.8 19.8 19.7 19.2 20.3 20.5
Argentina 38.3 37.9 34.9 43.6 37.9 39.2 36.3 36.9 32.4 34.7 32.3
Brazil 12.0 12.4 12.2 12.2 13.3 14.0 12.2 11.9 12.0 12.3 12.2
Mexico 11.5 18.5 18.2 19.2 17.3 17.0 16.8 17.9 17.4 17.7 18.2
Chile 38.0 45.9 42.3 40.0 42.1 45.3 45.0 42.8 42.8 43.2 42.2
Colombia 19.1 22.7 22.6 19.9 19.7 21.9 22.9 18.8 19.4 21.6 22.6
Venezuela 19.4 22.6 42.7 18.8 18.6 21.4 22.6 23.8 26.9 35.0 42.7
Peru 27.3 28.1 26.1 27.7 28.2 28.6 28.1 27.3 25.4 26.6 26.1
Uruguay 38.5 44.9 36.2 39.2 40.9 45.4 44.5 40.7 36.8 36.4 36.2
20102009
2008 2009 2010
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 a. Aggregate of the eight countries represented, except Uruguay. 
b. Private analysts consider that Argentinean GDP growth in 2008 and 2009 was considerably lower than the o??cial ?gures, although this discrepancy 
decreased in 2010. They also consider that the in?ation ?gures have been notably higher than the o??cial ones since 2007 onwards. 
c. Seasonally adjusted.
d. Four-quarter moving average. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 113 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2011 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY.  FIRST HALF OF 2011
This moderation was particularly notable in Brazil, as a result of the marked slowdown in in-
vestment, and to a lesser extent in Mexico, where it was due to a base effect. Indeed, the 
quarterly growth rates in Q3 and Q4 in Mexico were high, being well above those of Brazil. In 
the other countries, activity held fi rm, even tending to rise in Argentina and Colombia in the last 
quarter of the year, against a background of strong growth in domestic demand. Venezuela 
recorded, for the fi rst time since the beginning of the crisis, positive year-on-year growth in Q4, 
which represented a lag of one year with respect to the rest of the region and did not prevent 
GDP from falling in 2010 as a whole.
Growth continued to be based on the buoyancy of domestic demand, which contributed 7.7 
pp to GDP growth in Q4, while external demand remained relatively steady in its negative 
contribution to growth (2.4 pp) (see Chart 6). Private consumption remained notably strong. 
However, unlike in the fi rst half of the year, there was a certain moderation in gross capital 
formation and a lower contribution from the inventory cycle.
Thus, in the aggregate of the region, the growth rate of gross capital formation moderated to 
11.8% year-on-year from 16.5% in the second quarter (see Chart 6), with signifi cant differences 
between countries. On the one hand, investment accelerated in Argentina and Mexico. In the 
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latter country, the growth rate of investment increased particularly in construction and agriculture, 
since manufacturing, which had been the driving force of the recovery in 2009, tended to moder-
ate, perhaps indicating a certain replacement of the most-lagged sectors in the cycle and a pos-
sible shift of growth towards domestic demand. On the other hand, Brazil saw a sharp slowdown 
in gross capital formation from rates above 28% year-on-year in H1 to rates of 12% at the end of 
the year, in line with the recent performance of the industrial sector. This development was par-
ticularly marked in the capital goods sector, which contracted in Q3. Given that fi nancing condi-
tions and the investment outlook have remained favourable, and that foreign direct investment 
has recovered to levels close to its historical highs, the slowdown of the industrial sector is diffi cult 
to explain, against a background of widespread robustness of demand. In these circumstances, 
the exchange rate –which in real effective terms has been very high in countries such as Brazil or 
Colombia– may have contributed to the moderation of investment (see Box 1).
Private consumption, by contrast, held at robust growth rates in the aggregate of the region, 
around 6.5% in Q4 (see Chart 6), in line with the favourable performance of the labour market, 
which continued to perform better than in previous recoveries. Unemployment rates fell to lev-
els similar to or lower than those before the crisis in the main South American countries (see 
Chart 7). In Brazil, this indicator moved through successive historical lows to stand at 5.3% in 
December; in Argentina it stood at 7.3% and in Chile and Peru decreased rapidly to approach 
the low before the crisis. Meanwhile, in Mexico, although the labour market situation improved 
in the six-month review period, it continued to be more fragile, which, along with the slow re-
covery of remittances due to the weakness of the American labour market, tended to hinder the 
recovery of private consumption. In the countries where the labour market was fi rmer, wage 
growth generally adjusted to that of infl ation. In Mexico are, by contrast, wages decreased 
moderately in nominal terms. Against this background, consumer confi dence indicators re-
mained at very high levels and credit to the private sector tended to take off (see Chart 7). In 
Brazil and Peru, credit expanded again at rates above 20% year-on-year in real terms, prompt-
ing the introduction of macroprudential measures and restrictions in some segments, while in 
Mexico it recouped positive growth rates after two years of contraction or stagnation, and in the 
other countries it seems to be growing at rates in accordance with the position in the cycle.
Turning to the external sector, real imports grew rapidly (at year-on-year rates above 23% in the 
region as a whole in 2010 Q4), while real exports posted growth rates around 11%. Despite the 
high growth elasticity of imports, the increase in the terms of trade (20% in the region in 2010) has 
continued to allow the trade balance of the region to remain in appreciable surplus (2% of regional 
GDP). In fact, the seven countries on which this report focuses recorded trade surpluses in 2010, 
although in most cases the contribution of price changes exceeded that of the volumes traded. In 
this respect, it should be noted that in 2007 the trade surplus was more than twice the current one, 
and that, if the current surplus were adjusted for a level of commodity prices in line with the long-
term historical level, the trade balance would show a defi cit of around 1% of the GDP of the region 
(see Chart 7).
The region registered an aggregate current defi cit of -0.7% of GDP in 2010 with notable differ-
ences between countries (see Chart 8). In some countries, including Brazil, there was a notable 
deterioration, particularly due to the behaviour of the services balance, which may be related to the 
strength of the exchange rate. The rapid accumulation of reserves which continued in this period 
in the whole of the region shows that the fi nancing of the current account defi cit has not posed a 
problem (see Chart 8). However, in some countries, despite the recent recovery of direct invest-
ment fl ows, the fi nancing structure continued to be more dependent on other fl ows considered to 
be less stable, and, in fact, in some countries this investment does not cover the current defi cit.
BOX ?
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Latin America has traditionally been a commodity exporting region, 
a feature which has become more noticeable in the past decade 
(Chart 1) as a result of the growth in demand for these products by 
the Asian developing economies, particularly China. This growth has 
been refl ected in an upward trend in commodity prices since 2003, 
which has sharply increased the region’s terms of trade (the ratio of 
export prices to import prices). Thus the last seven years have seen 
cumulative increases of 14% in Mexico, 25% in Brazil, 28% in Ar-
gentina, 55% in Peru, 60% in Colombia, 110% in Chile and 353% in 
Venezuela, and it has stood at record highs since the 1990s in most 
countries (see Chart 1).
Higher terms of trade benefi t the region in numerous ways. These 
include improved income, which boosts demand and activity; higher 
public revenue; improved external balance, as the increase in nominal 
exports tends to offset the increase in imports derived from the strong 
growth of domestic demand; and the attraction of capital fl ows, 
whether in the form of direct investment in the primary sector or in 
other forms, due to the general improvement in growth prospects. 
However, the increase in the terms of trade may also bring unfavour-
able economic effects. For example, the expansion induced by it 
tends to generate infl ation and may increase the volatility of the busi-
ness cycle, since commodity prices are usually less stable than those 
of manufactures or services, and may even give rise to a deterioration 
in institutional quality.1 Finally, the increase in the terms of trade may 
give rise to so-called “Dutch disease”, which is analysed in this box.
The term “Dutch disease” was coined by The Economist in 1977 
to describe the recession in the Dutch manufacturing sector fol-
lowing the discovery of large gas reserves in the North Sea, and 
describes the loss of competitiveness of a country’s tradable sec-
tor derived from the effects of exploitation of natural resources 
with a high world demand. The consequent improvement in the 
terms of trade generates an inflow of foreign exchange from ex-
ports and simultaneously an expansion of demand which leads to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, either through nominal 
appreciation or through increased inflation, and gives rise to a de-
terioration in relative prices between tradable goods (except com-
modities) and non-tradables (particularly services). Moreover, 
when the relative profitability of investment in the primary sector 
versus in the non-tradable sector increases, resources tend to be 
diverted to those sectors and, depending on the degree of flexibil-
ity of the factor markets, upward pressure is put on wages and on 
the return on capital in the economy as a whole, further prejudicing 
the competitiveness of the sectors subject to international compe-
tition. In the medium term, the increase in the value of the primary 
sector exports may not offset the decrease in the exports of other 
sectors (particularly if the volume of commodity exports is not very 
price elastic, as in the case of non-renewable resources or those 
requiring long-term investment, such as oil, gas or mining). This 
situation, along with the fact that part of the increase in national 
income passes through to imports, may end up worsening the ex-
ternal balance. 
Is there evidence of the presence of this type of phenomenon in the 
region? Chart 2 shows some indicators which allow this possibility 
to be evaluated. First, there seems to be a correlation between the 
behaviour of the terms of trade and that of real effective exchange 
1COMMODITY PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION: ARE THERE SIGNS OF DUTCH DISEASE 
IN LATIN AMERICA?
SOURCES: World Bank and national sources. 
 
a. Percentage points. Comprising food, agricultural commodities, fuels and metals. 
b. Includes central America and the Caribbean. 
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1. See, among others, A. Gelb et al (1988), Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? 
World Bank, Oxford University Press, and Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. 
Warner (2001), “The curse of natural resources”, European Economic Re-
view, vol. 45. 
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BOX ?TÍTULO RECUADRO 1COMMODITY PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION: ARE THERE SIGNS OF DUTCH DISEASE 
IN LATIN AMERICA? (cont’d)
rates in the region,2 especially in Brazil, although also in Mexico, 
Colombia and Chile.3 In some countries, the real effective exchange 
rate stood, like the terms of trade, at a historical high.4 Furthermore, 
as shown by the chart, from 2010 Q2 various Latin American coun-
tries have experienced an appreciable disassociation between sup-
ply indicators, such as industrial production (stagnant since summer 
2010) and demand indicators, such as retail sales, which continue to 
grow strongly. 
As shown by the sectoral disaggregation in the middle left-hand pan-
el of Chart 2, the primary sectors of certain countries (boosted by 
commodity prices), the most strongly consumption-oriented services 
sectors (boosted by domestic demand growth) and other non-trada-
ble goods sectors, such as construction, have led growth in the latest 
expansionary phase, while the manufacturing sectors have lagged. 
These trends are most noticeable in the case of Brazil, where average 
GDP growth between 2007 and 2010 (4.5%), driven by telecommu-
nications, trade and mining, is much higher than that of the manufac-
turing sector (2.7%). However, similar kinds of development occur in 
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. Peru is an exception, since its indus-
try unrelated to the primary sector has grown at a very similar rate to 
that of the average of the other sectors and of GDP. 
Additional evidence would be provided by a shift of resources to 
more profi table sectors following an increase in the terms of trade. In 
this respect, the ratio between employment in industry and in ser-
vices has decreased sharply in various countries in the region (Brazil, 
Peru and Colombia), although this decrease was not because of a fall 
in employment in industry, but rather because of a much higher rise 
in employment in services.5 
Further, the bottom panels of Chart 2 show that commodity exports 
have grown strongly in volume in most countries of the region (except 
oil in Mexico and Venezuela, the production of which has been de-
clining for some time), in clear contrast to the volume of manufactur-
ing exports, which either fell year-on-year throughout 2010 or slowed 
sharply (except in Peru and, to a lesser extent, Chile), perhaps indi-
cating that manufactured goods exports are being crowded out by 
commodity exports.6 Finally, the current account balance deteriorat-
ed during 2010, as is natural in economies with high demand growth 
and imports growing faster than exports. However, these develop-
ments were not attributable to the goods balance, whose surplus 
increased, but rather to the services balance (more than half of the 
deterioration), refl ecting the increase in national income, and to the 
income balance, which seems to refl ect a higher repatriation of divi-
dends of the fi rms exploiting the region’s resources (see Chart 11 of 
the main text for the case of Brazil). 
In short, although the evidence is not conclusive and the picture is 
complicated by some structural characteristics of the countries,7 
certain signs point to some negative effects of the exchange rate 
appreciation on the competitiveness and performance of other 
sectors exposed to international competition, such as the fall in the 
volume of manufacturing exports in some countries at a time of 
buoyant commodity exports and sharp exchange rate apprecia-
tion, the weaker recovery of employment in manufactures com-
pared with other sectors more tightly linked to domestic demand 
and, above all, the stagnation of industrial production despite the 
boom in demand. 
However, to be able to speak of Dutch disease in the strict sense, 
it would be necessary to demonstrate that what dominates real 
exchange rate behaviour is the improvement in the terms of trade 
derived from the commodity price boom. And this is diffi cult to 
prove because another factor (strong capital infl ows) has recently 
been infl uencing the trend of real exchange rate depreciation in the 
region. Thus the correlation between capital infl ows and real ex-
change rate appreciation is very high for Brazil, Mexico and Colom-
bia, as seen in Chart 3. However, it can be argued that some coun-
tries’ capital infl ows are partly induced by the commodity boom 
itself, insofar as this tends to attract capital into the commodity 
sectors or, indirectly, to improve growth prospects. Thus a high 
correlation between terms of trade and capital infl ows is discerni-
ble in the recent period, above all in Brazil and Peru (see Chart 3). 
Therefore, although capital infl ows hinder recognition of the symp-
toms of Dutch disease in Latin America, they may constitute an 
additional channel through which the improvement in the terms of 
trade negatively affects the competitiveness of non-primary ex-
ports in these countries. 
Given the prospects of ongoing growth in demand, particularly 
that from Asia, it is likely that commodity prices will remain high 
and hence that the direct investment flows associated with the 
primary sector will also be significant, as compared with more 
FIRST HALF OF 2011
2. Most of the calculations in this box exclude Argentina and Venezuela be-
cause they use the exchange rate as a monetary policy instrument, which 
means that the relationship between the terms of trade and the exchange 
rate is of little use for our purposes. In other cases, the calculations exclude 
Mexico, given that it is the country with the lowest proportion of commodities 
in its exports, and given that the development of its industry is more closely 
linked to the US cycle and to relative wages than to the real exchange 
rate. 3. In the case of Chile, the low correlation between the terms of trade 
and the real exchange rate is because a large part of the income gains de-
rived from higher commodity prices are accumulated in the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund (Fondo de Riqueza Soberano), which short-circuits the transmission of 
higher export income to the nominal exchange rate.  4. The correlation 
should be established within the framework of an empirical model which 
takes into account, in addition, other drivers of appreciation, such as growth, 
public expenditure, remittances and capital fl ows. In this respect, López, Mo-
lina and Bussolo (2007) consider that, in a wide sample of emerging econo-
mies, a 1% increase in the terms of trade would generate an appreciation of 
0.3% in the real exchange rate, with the ratios being signifi cant in most cas-
es. 5. 58% in services against 29% in industry between 2005 and 2010 in 
Peru, or 21% against 4% in Brazil.
6. The case of Chile may be special because it has entered into a multitude 
of free trade agreements which enable it to take advantage of niche markets 
in each case, which may lessen somewhat the infl uence of the exchange rate 
on the competitiveness of industry. The use of this strategy, albeit from a 
more recent date, has also been embraced by Peru. 7. For example, Brazil 
is a country whose openness to trade measured as imports and exports in 
proportion to GDP is very low, and furthermore its manufactures are rela-
tively diversifi ed.
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SOURCES: National sources. 
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BOX 1
volatile and less persistent behaviour of other flows. This would 
strengthen the trends of an increasing primary-sector presence in 
the export structure and of a structurally higher real exchange rate. 
To counteract the competitive difficulties of their non-primary in-
dustries, the Latin American countries should consider structural 
policies designed to improve industrial productivity. Particularly 
significant in this respect are the proposals that a part of the 
wealth generated by natural resources should be created or ac-
cumulated in sovereign wealth funds (Chile, Colombia and Peru) 
and the recommendation to develop national sectors comple-
menting the exploitation of natural resources, which generate ex-
ternalities for the rest of the economy, such as the implementation 
of new technologies and longer-term policies to improve educa-
tional standards and physical and human capital. At times like the 
present, characterised by trend appreciation of real exchange 
rates and sharply increasing demand, it seems advisable to make 
use of the exchange rate flexibility to prevent real appreciation 
from occurring through the mechanism of rising inflation. There-
fore, policies designed to prevent overreaction of the nominal ex-
change rate derived from capital flow cycles, such as foreign ex-
change intervention or the imposition of capital controls, should be 
carefully calibrated. 
COMMODITY PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION: ARE THERE SIGNS OF DUTCH DISEASE 
IN LATIN AMERICA? (cont’d)
SOURCES: National sources. 
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One of the main changes in the macroeconomic performance of Latin America in the last six 
months has been the rise in infl ation, which is approaching rates of 6.5% year-on-year in the 
regional aggregate (see Chart 9). This increase is largely explained by the performance of 
Brazil, where the year-on-year rate reached 6.3% in March, in the upper half of the target 
band. In Peru, Chile and Colombia, price rises were more moderate, reaching rates of 2.7%, 
3.4% and 3.2%, respectively, although in all of them infl ation expectations have trended 
upwards (see Table 2). Only in Mexico did infl ation decrease to 3% (in the middle of the 
target band), thanks to the disappearance of the base effect of the VAT rise in early 2010, 
favoured by the persistence of a certain output gap and the strengthening trend of the ex-
change rate in recent months. At the opposite extreme, Argentina and Venezuela continued 
recording very high infl ation (around 10% and 29%, respectively). In Argentina, private ana-
lysts’ estimates are above 20% and there is a certain concern about a possible price and 
wage rise spiral.
Until mid-2010, consumer prices performed favourably in the fi ve countries with infl ation targets 
(against a background in which output gaps had not yet closed), although risks associated with 
Prices and 
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commodity (particularly food) price rises were already apparent in the international markets. 
Given the high share of food in the consumer basket of Latin American countries, the ac-
celeration of food prices in international markets from September (by more than 40%) 
prompted a rise in infl ation in all countries. Also, there is a risk that the recent energy price 
rise will reinforce this trend, not so much by its direct effect (which in many countries is less-
ened by petrol consumption subsidies and by its lower weight in the CPI basket), but by its 
impact on food prices.
The main risk of pass-through of food and other commodity price rises to consumer prices 
(illustrated in Chart 9) is in the appearance of second-round affects, with a labour market near 
to full employment and possibilities of overheating in various countries. However, for the time 
being these effects have not been observed (indeed, core infl ation has risen more moderately 
than overall infl ation) and monetary policies seem to be responding more fi rmly in recent 
months, at least in some countries. However, as a recent comparison, it should be remem-
bered that in 2008 food price rises pushed overall infl ation towards rates of 8% year-on-year 
in the region as a whole and that core infl ation was not far behind it.
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a. Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven biggest economies. 
b. Four-quarter moving average. 
c. Change in reserves in 2009 and 2010 as a percentage of 2010 GDP. 
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Against this background, four of the fi ve countries with infl ation targets have continued or 
commenced the cycle of offi cial interest rate rises in the last six months (see Chart 9 and 
Box 2). The capital infl ow which took place between September and November 2010 tem-
porarily interrupted the interest rate rises in Brazil and Peru during the closing months of 
2010 and moderated them in Chile. After a four-month pause, the central bank of Brazil 
again raised the offi cial interest rate in January, against a background of lower pressure from 
capital infl ows, setting it at 12.00% in April, which amounted to a cumulative rise of 275 bp 
from the beginning of the upturn. This rise, which is moderate in historical terms, was ac-
companied by a wide range of macroprudential and capital control measures designed to 
contain credit growth, evidencing a change in the focus of monetary policy instrumentation. 
This, together with the exchange rate appreciation of nearly 20% in real effective terms since 
the beginning of 2010, amounts to a notable tightening of monetary conditions in Brazil. 
However, real interest rates continue to be 2 pp below those in 2008 and there was another 
injection of funds into public sector banks at the beginning of 2011, which might reactivate 
public credit following the moderation in late 2010.
INFLATION AND OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES 
Year-on-year rates of change and percentage 
CHART 9
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In Chile there was also a certain slowdown in the pace of offi cial interest rate rises at the end 
of 2010, against a background of exchange rate strength, which gave rise to the announce-
ment of a $12 billion reserve accumulation programme to contain the appreciation of the peso 
and strengthen the international liquidity position (up to 17% of GDP). However in March, 
amidst lower exchange pressures, Chile surprised the markets with a rise of 50 bp in the of-
fi cial interest rate, larger than expected, to 4%, followed by another 50 bp in April, intended to 
correct the disanchoring of infl ation expectations in recent months. In Peru, the offi cial interest 
rate stood at 4% in April, representing a cumulative increase of 275 bp in the current cycle, 
while the foreign currency reserves held to meet external obligations due in less than two years 
and the bank reserve ratio increased considerably. In Colombia, the upward cycle in monetary 
policy began in 2011, with three rises of 25 bp in February, March and April, signalling the 
beginning of normalisation of interest rates, consistent with the gradual recovery of the econ-
omy and the rising trend in infl ation. Finally, only Mexico among the countries with a infl ation 
target held offi cial interest rates steady (at 4.5%). Despite the offi cial interest rate rises, in the 
fi ve countries with infl ation targets as a whole the weighted average interest rate remained 
around 3 pp below the level at the beginning of 2008 (see Chart 9).
In Argentina monetary policy has not reacted to the progressive increase in infl ation since mid-
2009 (M2, which is the target, continued growing at high rates); rather, the government has 
reimposed price controls and prohibited some agricultural exports. Nor did monetary policy 
respond to the higher infl ation in Venezuela, where the interest rate ceilings on loans and de-
posits remained unchanged.
Most notable in the fi scal area in 2010 was the stabilisation of both primary and total public 
balances at regional level following the improvement in H1 (see Chart 10). Despite the limited 
progress in the recovery of a more restrictive fi scal stance and although primary expenditure 
continued growing strongly in real terms (see Chart 10), the public fi nances ended 2010 with 
a primary surplus and a moderate reduction in the budget defi cit at regional level. As an ex-
ception, the Mexican public fi nances showed a certain deterioration with respect to 2009, 
due mainly to the increase in pension expenditure and despite the higher growth of the 
economy. The fi scal projections for 2011 foresee some changes in the region as a whole. 
Brazil announced a signifi cant cut in budgeted expenditure in 2011 (by 1.2% of GDP), in or-
der to rein in the rate of growth of the economy and the infl ationary pressure. Although the 
measure has value as signalling mechanism, its restrictive nature is not absolutely clear, since 
the fi nal expenditure in 2011 will be higher than that in 2010. Chile and Peru have also re-
cently announced reductions in budgeted public expenditure of around 0.4%-0.3% of GDP 
for 2011, respectively.
Target Dec-10 Ful?llment Target Expectations (a) Target Expectations (a)
Brazil 4.5 ± 2 5.9 Yes 4.5 ± 2 6.0 4.5 ± 2 4.9
Mexico 3 ± 1 4.4 No 3 ± 1 3.8 3 ± 1 3.8
Chile 3 ± 1 3.0 Yes 3 ± 1 4.3 3 ± 1 3.4
Colombia 3 ± 1 3.2 Yes 3 ± 1 3.7 3 ± 1 3.6
Peru 2 ± 1 2.1 Yes 2 ± 1 3.1 2 ± 1 2.5
2011
Country
2010 2012
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2 
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts. 
 
a. April 2011 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year. 
BOX ?
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 123 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2011 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY.  FIRST HALF OF 2011
TÍTULO RECUADRO 2PAST, P SENT AND FUTURE OF CENTRAL BANKING IN LATIN AMERICA
Since the beginning of the 1980s there have been signifi cant changes 
in the institutional design and monetary policy conduct of central 
banks at global level. In Latin America these changes arrived later, in 
the 1990s, but were more radical, since they enabled the region to 
leave behind a regime of high monetary instability. This Box describes 
the changes undergone by the Latin American central banks in the 
past two decades and their main achievements, making special men-
tion of the effi cient management at the height of the global fi nancial 
crisis, and also looks at the challenges going ahead.1
For decades the role of Latin American central banks was largely subor-
dinated to the fi nancing needs of the public sector. This gave rise to 
numerous and recurring bouts of high infl ation, and even hyperinfl ation, 
which had increasing costs in terms of growth and revenue distribution. 
In the early 1990s, owing to the broad social consensus in favour of 
greater price stability, increased independence was granted to central 
banks, price stability was set as their primary objective and lending to 
government was prohibited or limited in amount. These reforms were 
supplemented by other institutional changes to facilitate the task of 
monetary policy. Such changes included most notably lesser fi scal laxity 
and improved regulation and supervision of banking systems, which 
arose also as a response to the recurring banking crises in the region in 
the preceding decades. In some cases exchange rates and monetary 
aggregates were progressively abandoned as nominal anchors and re-
placed by monetary regimes based on direct infl ation targets as a 
mechanism for fi xing expectations. Although the region remains highly 
heterogeneous with regard to monetary policy regimes, fi ve central 
banks adopted infl ation targets between 1999 and 2002 (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru), while Argentina adopted a monetary ag-
gregate as its target,2 Venezuela retains a fi xed exchange rate and other 
countries, such as Ecuador, have formally replaced their currency by the 
dollar. In any event, a characteristic of the Latin American infl ation target 
regimes on which this Box particularly focuses is that they have contin-
ued considering the exchange rate as a signifi cant policy variable, a 
conviction which has led them to intervene in the foreign exchange mar-
kets to, among other things, limit exchange rate volatility. 
Thanks to their improved institutional design and greater level of inde-
pendence, central banks, particularly those with infl ation targets, 
helped Latin America to achieve greater macroeconomic stability and 
greater monetary policy credibility. This helped the region to partici-
pate in the prolonged expansionary phase of the world economy in 
the fi rst few years of the new century, against a background of relative 
price stability, despite their past history of notable fi nancial volatility 
and currency depreciation. Indeed, although there is some disagree-
ment in this respect, most studies in the empirical literature fi nd that 
countries with infl ation targets have reduced the level and volatility of 
infl ation and enjoy generally more stable activity.3 
More recently, the Latin American economies have found a way to man-
age signifi cant shocks more successfully than in the past. These shocks 
include the food and fuel price rises in 2007/2008 and, subsequently, 
the impact of the global fi nancial crisis, which in Latin America took the 
form of a short recession followed by a strong recovery. In this respect, 
it was the fi rst time that use could be made of a counter-cyclical mone-
FIRST HALF OF 2011
SOURCES: Datastream and national sources. 
 
a. Five countries with in?ation targets: Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru. 
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1. This Box takes as its main reference a conference held last December at the 
Banco de España. The conference was given by Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Univer-
sidad Católica de Chile) on the occasion of the V High Level Seminar of the Euro-
system and the Latin American central banks. The Box also includes the discus-
sions which followed the conference and those in the seminar. See Documentos 
Ocasionales No. 1102 of the Banco de España, “Central Banking in Latin Ameri-
ca: Changes, Achievements, Challenges”. The articles cited in this Box and which 
are also listed in the bibliography given here are not referenced in their full form.
2. Nevertheless, in practice it also treats the exchange rate of the peso against 
the dollar as a nominal anchor. 3. There is controversy over the effectiveness 
of infl ation target regimes in reducing the level and volatility of infl ation and the 
volatility of production, depending largely on the econometric method used. 
Thus Mishkin y Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) fi nd evidence of this improvement in 
effi ciency, while S. Lin and H. Ye (2009), «Does Infl ation Targeting Make a Dif-
ference in Developing Countries?», Journal of Development Economics, 89, 
pp. 118-123, fi nd it for emerging countries as a whole, although with a great 
heterogeneity among them depending on the characteristics of the country. 
Finally, R. Brito and B. Bystedt (2010), “Infl ation Targeting in Emerging Coun-
tries: Panel Evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 91, pp. 198-210, 
do not fi nd these effects to be signifi cant.
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2
tary policy, which managed to signifi cantly reduce interest rates when 
conditions so required thanks to the greater exchange rate fl exibility. 
Comparison of the drivers of the two most recent recessions in the re-
gion, i.e. those in 1998-1999 (linked to the Asian crisis) and 2008-2009 
(linked to the global fi nancial crisis), reveals that opposite fi nancial policy 
responses were followed in the two cases: in the fi rst, the region’s central 
banks had to raise offi cial interest rates to defend the fi xed exchange 
rate; in the second, the central banks with infl ation targets reduced 
them. The result was that in the fi rst recession real interest rates in-
creased much more than in the second and that the negative effect of 
real interest rates on growth was insignifi cant in the second [Corbo and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2010)].
Furthermore, in the recent crisis non-conventional policy responses 
could be used, such as the reduction of reserve ratios, the granting of 
liquidity in local currency and foreign currency,4 or the relaxation of 
collateral requirements, all of which were important in mitigating its 
impact on the fi nancial system. Also, interventions in the exchange 
markets to moderate downward pressure on currencies helped to 
cushion the impact of the crisis. In this respect the region’s central 
banks applied the infl ation target regimes fl exibly during the period of 
fi nancial stress, and interventions were more effective in mitigating ex-
change rate volatility than under other monetary policy approaches.5 
Having passed this crucial test for monetary policy credibility, the Lat-
in American central banks now face a signifi cant number of challeng-
es, some of them shared with other central banks. Notable among 
them are the reform of supervision and regulation following the crisis, 
the integration of macroprudential regulation with more conventional 
monetary policy instruments, and the analysis of the implications of 
asset prices and fi nancial frictions for monetary policy. They also share 
common challenges with the central banks which have infl ation tar-
gets, such as improving transparency and communication, deciding 
on the advisability of adopting an overall or core infl ation target, etc, or 
choosing whether or not to raise infl ation targets as a means of tack-
ling the problem posed by the offi cial interest rate fl oor, an issue which 
is particularly controversial in a region where monetary policies have 
probably not yet reached maximum credibility.
Moreover, the characteristic features of Latin America entail some 
specifi c challenges. Latin American countries are highly sensitive to 
external shocks, since the region is relatively open both commercially 
and fi nancially, an exporter of commodities whose prices are set on 
the international markets and the recipient of capital fl ows which by 
their very nature are volatile. Thus in recent years many of the region’s 
central banks have periodically faced a monetary policy dilemma. 
This dilemma comes about when an upturn in infl ation, partly derived 
from improved terms of trade due to commodity price rises, would 
make it advisable to raise interest rates, but there is a fear that such 
interest rate rises may trigger exchange rate appreciation and exces-
sive and destabilising capital infl ows, in a setting in which the ex-
change rate is already relatively high. For this reason, some of the 
region’s central banks (Brazil, Colombia and Peru) have opted to raise 
reserve ratios, among other measures, so that monetary policy is 
more restrictive but does not attract capital fl ows.
To cope with this monetary policy dilemma, some governments and 
central banks in the region have also adopted other measures as the 
economic recovery and fi nancial stability have progressively returned to 
the region. These measures (see accompanying table) are designed to 
moderate capital infl ows or facilitate capital outfl ows and, in some cas-
es, can be considered full-fl edged capital controls. However, they are 
temporary measures to mitigate real exchange rate appreciation which, 
in a situation of economic boom and commodity price rises, tends to 
follow an upward trend. To prevent such an exchange rate adjustment, 
recourse must be had to fundamentals, in particular by means of an in-
crease in domestic saving, specifi cally that of the public sector. This situ-
ation calls for fi scal policies of a more counter-cyclical nature, reinforced, 
where appropriate, by fi scal rules (for example, saving what is consid-
ered to be the temporary component of a commodity price rise in sov-
ereign wealth funds) to ensure that the various policies are consistent. 
Meanwhile, maintaining the anti-infl ationary credibility of central banks is 
probably the best contribution to resolving these dilemmas and to fos-
tering an environment of monetary stability conducive to growth.
PAST, P SENT AND FUTURE OF CENTRAL BANKING IN LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
COUNTRY
(implementation date in brackets)
Restrictions on ?nancial ?ows 
(capital controls)
Taxes on ?nancial in?ows Brazil (Oct-10, Mar-11, Apr-11)
Liberalisation of ?nancial ?ows Liberalisation of capital out?ows Chile (Nov-10), Peru (various)
Higher capital ratio Brazil (Dec-10)
Higher reserve ratio
Macroprudential measures
Brazil (Dec-10), Peru (various)
  Tax on credit to natural persons Brazil (Apr-11)
Higher reserve ratio for deposits
denominated in foreign currency
Peru (Jul, Sep and Oct-10)
Limit on short position in foreign currency of banks Brazil (Jan-11), Peru (Feb-11)
MEASURE DESCRIPTION
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
4. Thanks to the international reserves accumulated, to the swap facilities with 
the Federal Reserve (Brazil and Mexico) and to the FCL credit lines with the IMF 
(Colombia and Mexico). 5. Berganza and C. Broto (2011), Flexible Infl ation 
Targets, Forex Interventions and Exchange Rate Volatility in Emerging Coun-
tries, Documentos de Trabajo No. 1105, Banco de España.
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Following the boost received in mid-2010 with the signature of the common customs code, Mer-
cosur made headway in institutional matters (agreements on the drafting of investment guaran-
tees and anti-monopoly laws, among others) and in its process of increasingly greater openness 
to trade. To achieve this, it signed an agreement to grant reciprocal tariff preferences with G20 
countries (Korea, India and Indonesia) and with certain major customers for its products (Egypt), 
as well as Cuba, Malaysia and Morocco. The Senate of Paraguay delayed once again the admis-
sion of Venezuela to the block, and the European Union notifi ed that the agreement with Merco-
sur would not be concluded this year because of the diffi culties in agricultural issues.
In April the withdrawal of Venezuela from the CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones – Andean Com-
munity of Nations) will become effective, so this country and Colombia began conversations to enter 
into a treaty under which the treatment of bilateral trade would continue as it has to date. Another 
two members of the Andean Community (Peru and Colombia) took further steps in their strategy to 
reorient their trade towards the Pacifi c basin through bilateral treaties. Thus the free trade agreement 
between Korea and Peru came into force and the latter country entered into an agreement with 
Japan, announced its intention to negotiate with India and unilaterally reduced the average tariff.
Trade integration 
processes and structural 
policies
MAIN PUBLIC SECTOR FIGURES 
Percentage of GDP and index 
CHART 10 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Seven biggest economies. 
b. De?ated by the CPI. 
c. Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offers of 2005 and 2010. 
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Colombia intends to enter into a treaty with Korea in June 2011 and has initiated conversations with 
Turkey, while it expects the US Congress to approve the free trade treaty between the two coun-
tries. In February the renewal of the ATPDA3 tariff preferences with Colombia expired. Mexico and 
Peru entered into a free trade agreement, and Chile did so with Malaysia and began conversations 
with Indonesia. Finally, Mexico and the United States resolved the problem of the suspension of an 
agreement to provide Mexican transport services within the framework of the North American Free 
Trade Treaty (NAFTA), whereby Mexico suspended the tariffs that it had announced by way of re-
prisal in summer 2010. Mexico and Brazil announced their intention to reach an agreement on 
economic integration that will enable each of them to complement its industrial sector.
In the area of structural reform, Chile announced the gradual implementation of a mechanism 
to shorten export administrative processes and some privatisations of public service compa-
nies and the creation of a Financial Stability Board. In Mexico, the opposition senators tabled 
a fi scal reform project (which may be a sign of future initiatives in this fi eld) including a tax on 
certain foodstuffs at the general VAT rate. In Venezuela, the executive branch maintained its 
policy of expropriations and approved, in the fi nal stage of the legislature, the Banking Law, 
which paves the way for nationalisation of the sector and includes provisions which raise the 
discretionary powers of the public sector to manage lending and fi nancial system assets.
In Brazil, GDP grew by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in 2010 Q4, representing a pick-up with respect 
to the preceding quarter. However, in the second half of the year activity lost dynamism sharply, 
as indicated by the year-on-year rates, which moderated to 5% in Q4, compared with average 
growth of 7.5% in 2010. The slowdown in activity came about because of the moderation of in-
vestment and, to a lesser extent, of public consumption, which led to slower growth of domestic 
demand (6.7% in Q4, against 10% in the previous quarters). By contrast, private consumption 
showed even greater momentum. The negative contribution of external demand decreased in Q4 
to 1.7 pp, after having exceeded 3 pp in the preceding quarters, as a result of the slowdown in 
imports (which nevertheless grew at a rate of 25%). The most frequent indicators for 2011 Q4 
continued to signal the strength of domestic demand and of its drivers, particularly the labour 
market, where the unemployment rate stood at a historical low. By contrast, industrial production, 
like that of other countries in the region, recorded a less positive performance in 2010 H2, al-
though there was a certain recovery in the opening months of 2011. The strength of activity is 
contributing to an upturn in infl ation which after several months of consecutive increases reached 
6.3% in March 2011, close to the upper range of the central bank’s target (4.5%, with bands of 
+/-2%). The infl ation expectations have also trended upwards, and for 2012 they are a few tenths 
of a percentage point above the central bank target. One of the pillars of domestic demand, 
namely bank credit, continued to expand, growing around 20% in real terms in January, with a 
slowdown in public credit (to 27% in January) and an increase in private credit (to 17%). Against 
this background, the central bank, after having held the offi cial interest rate unchanged since July 
2010, resumed interest rate rises in its January, March and April meetings, with increases of 50 
bp in the fi rst two meetings and 25 bp in the third, to bring the interest rate to 12%. Similarly, in 
December it adopted diverse macroprudential measures (such as changes in the bank reserve 
ratio and in capital ratios) to subdue the expansion of credit, and strengthened these measures 
and capital controls again in April amidst renewed upward pressure on the real.4 In the fi scal 
policy arena, the consolidated public sector primary surplus in 2010 as a whole was 2.8% of GDP, 
Economic developments 
by country
3. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Act. 4. Among other things, the following actions were taken: the reserve ratio 
was raised by an amount which it was considered would reverse the expansion of liquidity seen in 2008; an increase in 
the capital ratio for personal loans with maturities of more than two years was announced and an obligatory deposit of 
60% imposed on dollar-denominated short cash positions for resident banks; and the tax on transactions with non-res-
idents (6%) was extended successively so that in practice it applies to any transaction with a maturity of less than two 
years involving loans or bonds and this tax was raised to 3% for loans to individuals.
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which was below the target of 3.3% of GDP but above that of the previous year. However, this 
result was achieved with signifi cant extraordinary revenue from the sale of oilfi eld exploitation 
rights. The total budget balance was in defi cit (2.6% of GDP). The government expressed its in-
tention to pursue an anti-cyclical fi scal policy to help subdue infl ation, and announced that it 
would reduce expenditure by 50 billion reais (equivalent to 1.2% of GDP) with respect to that 
budgeted for 2011, which does not entail any spending cuts with respect to the previous year. 
Additionally, the legislative arm has approved the government’s proposal to increase the minimum 
wage by 7% in nominal terms, a measure which will also help to moderate current expenditure in 
2011 and, consequently, ease infl ationary pressure. By contrast, it was announced that 55 billion 
reais would be contributed to the development bank BNDES by the Treasury (compared with the 
110 billion reais provided in 2010), which, along with the funds obtained from traditional sources, 
means that this year the BNDES will have very nearly the same amount as in 2010 for fi nancing 
its programmes. In the external sector, there was a signifi cant deterioration in the current account 
balance, mainly as a result of the worsening of the income and services balance, although the 
trade surplus also decreased as a result of the strength of imports (see Chart 11). The fi nancial 
account includes high fi nancial infl ows, including most notably signifi cant foreign direct invest-
ment infl ows, which have led some analysts to suggest that this may stem from a certain strategy 
to circumvent the capital controls introduced in October. Against this background, the central 
bank has maintained its policy of building up reserves, which amounted to $317 billion at the end 
of March. Together with these purchases in the spot market, the central bank started to intervene 
in the derivatives market. Finally, in April Fitch raised its credit rating for Brazil by one level above 
the threshold investment grade, on the basis of the improvement in its fundamentals and policies.
In 2010 H2 the year-on-year rate of activity in Mexico slowed with respect to Q2, but the high 
pace of growth continued, with quarter-on-quarter rates of change in GDP of 0.8% of 1.3%, 
respectively, in Q3 and Q4. Growth in 2010 as a whole was 5.5%, of which approximately 3 
pp stem from a statistical carryover effect. In any event, in Q4 GDP reached its level before the 
crisis, although the output gap continued to be negative. On the demand side, private con-
sumption slowed in H2, while investment, particularly that by the private sector, continued in 
the opposite direction, although its growth rate held somewhat below that in the other econo-
mies of the region (except Venezuela). The contribution from inventories was very small, in 
contrast to their high contribution in H1. External demand contributed negatively to growth (by 
0.3 pp) in Q4, for the fi rst time since 2008 Q3. The data for 2011 seem to indicate a gradual 
improvement in the pace of growth. As regards the labour market, there was a certain im-
provement in the conditions and quality of employment in the closing months of 2010, which, 
however, does not recoup the ground lost during the crisis. The infl ation rate, which had 
reached 4.4% in October as a result of the rising food prices, tended to converge towards 3% 
in March, since the base effect which in 2010 entailed an increase in some tax rates had 
ceased to act. Core infl ation stands at 3.2%. The negative output gap and the recent appre-
ciation of the currency have contributed to an ongoing favourable outlook for infl ation, which 
is also refl ected in the persistence of the infl ation expectations for both 2011 and 2012. Against 
this background, the Bank of Mexico held offi cial rates at 4.5% (the level at which they have 
stood since July 2009). Credit for private consumption in real terms returned to year-on-year 
growth in 2010 Q4, despite the continuing fall in credit cards. In 2010 the current defi cit rep-
resented 0.5% of GDP, a level very similar to that recorded in 2009. However, in Q4 there was 
a notable worsening as a result of the sharp increase in dividend repatriation. Notable in the 
fi nancial account were the portfolio investment infl ows in 2010 Q4 (3.5% of GDP), particularly 
for the purchase of government securities in the money market. In view of the extraordinary 
rise in portfolio investment fl ows, the central bank held in place the mechanism designed to 
reduce volatility in currency appreciation and built reserves up to $122 billion (11.5% of GDP) 
by mid-March. In addition, the Mexican government renewed the fl exible credit line with the 
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IMF, but for a higher amount ($73 billion), thereby raising the available foreign currency funds 
to the average prevailing in the emerging countries. The public sector accounts worsened 
notably in H2, partly because of the larger contributions to public pensions, the total defi cit 
standing at 2.8% of GDP. However, excluding the PEMEX investment, the government defi cit 
would have been only 0.8% of GDP in 2010, compared with 0.2% in 2009. The government 
again arranged oil hedges for 2011 and, furthermore, made various issues in local currency 
and foreign currency which enabled it to pre-fi nance all external debt maturities until the pres-
idential elections in mid-2012.
In 2010 Q4, the GDP of Argentina showed a notable pick-up (2.5% quarter-on-quarter), after 
the lull in Q3 (0.7%), as a result of the greater buoyancy of domestic demand, which grew by 
12.3% year-on-year. The surge in private consumption was decisive in these developments, 
since investment slowed slightly in Q4, although it held at a high growth rate (nearly 25%), 
particularly in capital goods investment. Meanwhile, the contribution from external demand 
became much more negative (3.1 pp), due to the slowdown of exports, since imports decelerated 
BRAZIL, MEXICO, ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Four-quarter moving average. 
b. One-year growth expectations. 
c. Given the lack of provincial and municipal government data, it was assumed that growth was 
equal to that of the national government during that year. 
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only slightly. In 2010 as a whole Argentine GDP growth was 9.2%. This strong growth allowed 
the unemployment rate to continue falling to stand near the level before the crisis. The most 
frequent indicators seem to show that the strong dynamism held during the fi rst quarter of the 
year. In 2010 the current account showed a surplus of 1% of GDP compared with 3.6% in 
2009, partly due to a decrease in the trade balance, which stood at 4% of GDP in 2010, 
against 6% in 2009, despite strong export growth. Another factor contributing to the decrease 
in the current surplus was the decline in current transfers, due mainly to the allotment of SDRs 
by the IMF in 2009 Q3 ($2,662 million). The fi nancial account featured two positive factors. 
First, there was a notable decrease in capital outfl ows in 2010. Second, foreign direct invest-
ment showed a certain recovery to stand at 1.6% of GDP. International reserves held steady, 
since they were again used to make external public debt payments, a practice which will 
continue in 2011 for an amount around $7.5 billion. In 2010 the Argentine government re-
corded a primary surplus of 1.8% of GDP, compared with 1.5% in 2009, with growth of more 
than 30% in public revenue and expenditure. Thus the sharp increases in public expenditure 
by both the national and provincial governments in recent years has notably raised the propor-
tion it represents of GDP (see Chart 11). Moreover, for 2011 the government has ample dis-
cretionary powers, since the budget which the government sent to Congress was rejected 
and, for reasons of necessity and urgency, the President approved decrees which broaden its 
scope of action. Infl ation has been decreasing since October 2010 to stand at 10% in Febru-
ary. However, these rates are well below the private estimates and the offi cial infl ation in the 
provinces, and below the wage increases, which stand at nearly 27% year-on-year. Indeed, an 
IMF technical mission visited the country in order to create a new national price index. Year-
on-year growth of the M2 monetary aggregate, targeted by the central bank, stood at nearly 
30% and real interest rates continued to be negative, particularly if unoffi cial infl ation measure-
ments are taken into account. Meanwhile, the expansionary path of bank credit to the private 
sector quickened. The central bank continued to permit a gradual depreciation of the ex-
change rate against the dollar. In the review period, the Argentine government again opened 
the exchange facility for the holders of defaulted debt, although the offer was taken up by only 
some retail investors for small amounts, and the fi rst contacts were held with the Club of 
Paris, with which the government is seeking to conclude an agreement before the presidential 
elections in October.
Although the earthquake in February 2010 delayed somewhat the recovery of economic 
activity in Chile following the global fi nancial crisis, the pause was brief and strong growth 
was seen in the rest of the year (5.2% overall), despite a certain moderation in Q4 (quarter-
on-quarter growth of 0.9%). This good performance was explained by the extraordinary 
dynamism of domestic demand, which grew by 16.8% in 2010 H2, with private consump-
tion above 11.5% and private investment at nearly 20% (although investment in construc-
tion lagged somewhat behind). External demand made a negative contribution of more than 
12 pp in the second half of the year, as a result of the weakness of exports and of the ex-
traordinary strength of imports, with growth above 30%. However, the favourable trend in 
terms of trade allowed the trade balance to close 2010 with a surplus of nearly 8% of GDP 
and the current account balance to post a surplus equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, partly ex-
plained by higher current transfers (insurance indemnities to earthquake victims), which 
helped to offset the defi cit of 7.7% of GDP in the income balance. Notable on the supply 
side was a certain weakness in the industrial sector. On a positive note, and unlike in the 
period following the Asian crisis, the labour market has recovered notably. The sharp growth 
of domestic demand, the closure of the output gaps and the rise in commodity prices at 
international level caused infl ation to increase to 3.4% in March, above the central bank’s 
target (3%), although core infl ation measurements were lower. Contributing to this modera-
tion was the appreciation of the peso against the dollar (nearly 10% in 2010 H2). However, 
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there was a certain disanchoring of infl ation expectations, particularly shorter-term expecta-
tions in the past few months (see Chart 11). Against this background, the central bank 
raised the offi cial interest rate in all monetary policy meetings from June 2010 (400 bp in 
total, to 4.5%), except that in January, when the monetary policy dilemma became most 
evident. This dilemma led the central bank to announce interventions in the foreign ex-
change market to purchase reserves ($12 billion in 2011). In this respect, to cope with the 
upward pressure on the currency, the number of non-resident institutions authorised to is-
sue bonds on the local market was increased and the limit on investment abroad by pension 
funds was raised from 60% to 80%. Also, the government announced a reduction in budg-
eted public expenditure of 0.4% of GDP in 2011. In 2010 the government defi cit amounted 
to 0.4% of GDP (4.5% in 2009), signifying a structural defi cit of 2.1% of GDP (0.9% in 2009). 
This positive performance resulted from an increase in revenue of 28.4% in real terms (given 
the sound performance of copper revenues) and a rise in expenditure of 7%. In February the 
credit rating agency Fitch upgraded by one level its rating of Chilean sovereign debt de-
nominated in foreign currency. The good outlook for investment in the Chilean economy was 
also refl ected in the foreign direct investment received, which exceeded $15 billion in 2010 
(equivalent to 7.5% of GDP).
In Colombia economic activity contracted by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q3 and expanded by 
1.9% in Q4, this latter quarter being notable for the strong performance of investment (with 
growth of 10.2% year-on-year), which, along with consumption growth of nearly 5%, explains 
the dynamism of domestic demand. However, the higher growth of the economy at the end of 
the year is basically explained by the lower negative contribution from the external sector 
(which trimmed 2.2 pp from growth), as a result of lower import growth and greater export 
dynamism. In 2010 as a whole, the economy grew by 4.3%. Additionally, there was a signifi -
cant upward revision of the national accounts data from 2008, which in the case of GDP 
amounted to 0.8 pp in the growth rate for 2008 (lifting it to 3.5%) and 0.7 pp for 2009 (raising 
it to 1.5%). The higher-than-expected growth in Q4 and this upward revision resulted in a 
change in the estimates of the output gap and an improved understanding of the commence-
ment of the cycle of offi cial interest rate rises which began at the February meeting and con-
tinued in those of March and April (with three rises of 25 bp), against a background in which 
infl ation, although progressively increasing, stood at 3.2% in March, only 0.2 pp above the 
central bank’s infl ation target. Both the public fi nances and the trade balance were similar in 
2010 to those in 2009. In the external sector, the current account defi cit in Q4, which refl ected 
the income defi cit, was amply covered by the fi nancial infl ows of long-term foreign investment 
(which were, however, smaller than in previous quarters) and of short-term foreign investment. 
To cope with the upward pressure on the peso, the central bank maintained its policy of ac-
cumulating reserves (20 million pesos daily) and announced that it would extend it to June. 
Meanwhile, in November it took diverse measures to reduce the infl ow of dollars into the 
country and to increase demand by the private sector.5 Notably Standard and Poor’s up-
graded to “investment grade” the credit rating of Colombian sovereign debt denominated in 
foreign currency. Finally, Colombia has indicated its intention to renew for two years the fl exible 
credit line with the IMF which matures in May.
The GDP of Peru continued to grow rapidly in the second half of the year (3.1% and 2.4% 
quarter-on-quarter in Q3 and Q4, respectively). Year-on-year growth remained above 9% 
and the growth of domestic demand was noteworthy (14.2% in H2, although it slowed 
5. Including, among other measures: non-monetarisation to pesos of dollar-denominated State funds received as divi-
dends of the government corporation Ecopetrol and dollar-denominated debt issues already made; derogation of the 
income tax rebate for interest payments on external debt, except for fi nancial or trade credit institutions; and reduction of 
import tariffs on a large number of intermediate and capital goods.
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slightly in Q4). Notable within domestic demand was the strength of investment, which, al-
though slowing, grew by 22.6% year-on-year in Q4. Also worthy of mention is the progres-
sive pick-up in private consumption. The negative contribution of external demand in H2 
was nearly 5 pp, which occurred because exports, although more dynamic, grew much 
more slowly than imports. In 2010 as a whole, GDP grew by 8.8% (0.9% in 2009), and the 
estimates indicate that the output gap seems to have closed. The infl ation rate in recent 
months has held near the central bank’s target of 2%, although the March fi gure represents 
a certain rise (2.7%). Against this background, in January the central bank resumed the 
cycle of offi cial interest rate rises (four rises of 25 bp to a rate of 4% in April). Additionally, 
bank reserve requirements kept increasing. Also, the government announced two series of 
reductions in import tariffs, one temporary (in February) and one permanent (in January). 
Along the same lines, a draft law was approved to reduce the general sales tax by one per-
centage point to 18% and the fi nancial transactions tax from 0.05% to 0.005%. In April the 
government announced cuts to the budgeted expenditure for 2011 by the equivalent of 
0.3% of GDP and the consolidation of public sector saving in the stabilisation fund, which 
would double in 2011 (3.3% of GDP). In 2010, the non-fi nancial public sector recorded a 
primary surplus (0.6% of GDP, compared with -0.6% in 2009) as a result of higher growth in 
revenue (up nearly 20%) than in expenditure (up 10.7%). In 2010 the current account 
showed a defi cit equivalent to 1.5% of GDP (surplus of 0.2% in 2009). The trade surplus 
increased with respect to the previous year to stand at 4.4% of GDP (thanks to the increase 
of 18.2% in the terms of trade), but it was more than offset by the higher defi cit in income 
account, linked to the profi ts of non-resident fi rms and to the defi cit on the services account. 
Notable in the fi nancial account is the fact that nearly 75% of capital infl ows in 2010 were of 
a long-term nature (foreign direct investment or long-term loans). The exchange rate of the 
new sol against the dollar held steady at around 2.80, although in February the central bank 
made a series of discretionary dollar purchases to alleviate the upward pressure on the cur-
rency and in April it intervened for the opposite reason to moderate volatility in the run-up to 
the presidential elections.
In 2010 Q4 Venezuela recorded, for the fi rst time since 2009 Q1, a positive year-on-year 
growth rate (0.6%). However, the quarterly rates show that activity contracted in H2 (GDP 
did not grow in Q3 and fell by 0.5% in Q4). In 2010 as a whole the fall in GDP was 1.4% 
(against a decrease of 3.3% in 2009). Notable in H2 was the negative contribution of exter-
nal demand (6.6 pp), given the combined effect of a fall in exports and growth in imports, 
linked to the slightly positive growth of private consumption and, in particular, to the strength 
of public consumption. Domestic demand grew by nearly 6% year-on-year in H2, but did so 
basically through stockbuilding. The most frequent indicators show signs of a certain weak-
ness of private consumption in early 2011, although consumer credit has shown positive 
year-on-year rates in recent months, albeit well below the infl ation rate. The public sector 
posted higher nominal growth of revenue than of expenditure in 2010, which was refl ected 
in a decrease in the fi nancial and primary defi cits. Prices continued to give cause for con-
cern: since June the infl ation rate has always held above 25% and is currently very near to 
30%. The recent increase was mainly due to food price increases derived from international 
commodity price rises and from the unifi cation of the exchange rate for preferential imports 
decreed in January (in a country where more than 90% of consumer goods are imported). 
In January the unifi cation of the system of dual exchange rates, the nominal anchor of the 
economy, came into operation with the devaluation of the preferential rate applied to medi-
cine, food, research equipment and external debt payments from 2.6 bolivares per dollar to 
4.3 bolivares per dollar. Also, it was announced that transactions on the SITME (a parallel 
market organised by the central bank) will be carried out at a maximum rate of 5.3 bolivares 
per dollar, with the result that this market has become, in practice, the second offi cial exchange 
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rate of the country. It should also be noted that in recent months the volume traded on this 
market has decreased substantially, which has increased the scarcity of foreign currency in the 
economy through offi cial channels. The current account surplus stood in 2010 at nearly 7% of 
GDP, against 2.6% in 2009, this increase being explained by higher oil exports. Foreign direct 
investment amounted to $151 million in Q4, the fi rst positive fi gure since 2008 Q3, although in 
the year as a whole there were outfl ows of $1.4 billion. The fi nancial account (plus errors and 
omissions) showed a defi cit of somewhat more than $22 billion (nearly 11% of GDP). All this 
resulted in a loss of international reserves slightly above $8 billion.
2.5.2011.
